Aquinas’s doctrine analogy has faced much opposition, as illustrated in Thomas Williams’ claim that “either the doctrine of univocity is true or everything we say about God is the most straightforward sense unintelligible.”¹ I make a case for the intelligibility of Aquinas’s doctrine of analogy for language about God by focusing on the important semantic components involved in analogy in hopes of providing an epistemic ground for predicking names of God analogously. To this task, I address two versions of what I call the Second Semantic / Epistemic Problem (SSEP). First, I begin by briefly identifying the fundamental problem of Divine naming (as expressed by Moses Maimonides) followed by a presentation of Aquinas’s purported solution to this difficulty found in his analogy of proper proportionality. Next, I raise a Scotistic criticism of Aquinas’s view in the form of the SSEP. Basically, the SSEP arguments conclude that the doctrine of analogy lacks epistemological grounding insofar as it inappropriately presupposes a prior understanding of God in order to sufficiently alter a given concept to be proportionate to God. In hopes avoiding the conclusion of the SSEP, I introduce Aquinas’s distinction between a term’s mode of being and its ratio (Summa contra gentiles 1.34) in the context of analogy and show the ratio of a term can be altered proportionate to a consideration of the mode of being of God. I conclude with the observation that knowledge of God’s mode of being itself does not lack epistemological ground insofar as it is derived propter quia from God’s effects and can act as that prior grasp by which the ratio of a positive term predicated of God can be truthfully altered.