The intuition of being is central to Jacques Maritain’s understanding of Aquinas’s metaphysics in particular, and authentic metaphysics generally. Yet from the very beginning, this has been one of Maritain’s most controversial ideas, and one that few Neo-Thomists have been willing to embrace. Indeed, it has been the subject of much criticism, many seeing in it a vestige of Maritain’s earlier sympathy for the philosophy of Henri Bergson, and as such something entirely foreign to, or at best unnecessary for Thomas’s metaphysics. It is my belief, however, that this criticism is based on a failure to truly comprehend what Maritain means by this admittedly obscure notion. The purpose of my paper, then, will be to clarify, or to pin down, exactly what Maritain means by the intuition of being, and the role that he believed it plays in knowing the being of metaphysics. This clarification is absolutely crucial if we are ever to determine the rightful place of the intuition of being in Aquinas’s metaphysics, or if it has any place there at all. I begin by showing what the intuition of being is not, that is, by dispelling some of the common misconceptions about the intuition of being that have often resulted in its easy dismissal. Then, by carefully examining what Maritain actually says about the intuition of being and its role in grasping the being of metaphysics, primarily as presented in Degrees of Knowledge, Preface to Metaphysics, and Existence and the Existent, I show that the key to understanding this notion lies in the link that Maritain makes between being and intelligibility, i.e. by demonstrating that the intuition of being is embedded in the mind’s natural abstractive/judging process as implicitly the pre-condition for the very possibility of knowing and intelligibility, and as such is simply the natural outgrowth of the knowing process which, when examined critically or reflexively, is seen to necessarily culminate in an intensive eidetic visualization of the being of metaphysics at what Maritain has famously called the 3rd degree of formal abstraction. In effect, the intuition of being lies at the heart of the whole abstractive/judging endeavor. Consequently, it is not at all foreign to a critical realist epistemology grounded in the thought of Aquinas.